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PART^Eg 
1. Defendant? »nd thirfl~p$trty pXaintiffg are 
Landforms Construction Corp., Landforms Development Inc., 
Mark S. Sandberg, L. Wayne Redd, Lyle A. Hale, Hale/Redd 
Investment Group, a general partnership, a/k/a Redd Hale 
Investment Group and Hale/Redd Land Investment, a joint 
venture» These parties are landowners and developers of 
property known as Bridlewood located near homeowners' 
property in Davis County. (The partnership or joint venture 
formed by Mark S. Sandberg, L. Wayne Redd and Lyle A. Hale 
has been referred to by different titles; therefore, it is 
referred to in different ways in the pleadings .) 
2. Third-party defendants are Bountiful City and 
Davis County. 
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
iq. i em* ..)!JI' - .-.,•.•, -ider and hear 
this appeal pursuant to * he provisions of Section * of 
• M I I J- VI r r <« the C o r ^ i t ut i ^ n of pt^h, Rule - ot the 
Ku i es c. t utaJi supreme . . u i , - -.,• . •* < - i 
? O ) ( j i i 1988) , rimi Rule S4(b) of * h? ^tah Rules *t «*ivil 
Procedur e• 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err in granting Bountiful 
Summary Judgment and concluding that the acts complained of 
in the First Amended Complaint and the Amended Third-Party 
Complaint involved the management of flood waters or the 
construction, repair and operation of flood and storm 
systems. 
2. Is Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-30-3 (1986) 
unconstitutional? 
3. Does construing the Utah Comparative Fault Act 
require that Bountiful remain in the case for the purpose of 
determining comparative fault? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
VTAH CONSTITUTION, Article Ir Section 22 
[private property for public use] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. Section 63-30-3 (1986) 
Immunity of governmental entities from suit. 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this 
chapter, all governmental entities are immune from 
suit for any injury which results from the 
exercise of a governmental function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or 
other governmental health care facility, and from 
an approved medical, nursing, or other 
professional health care clinical training 
program conducted in either public or private 
facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other natural 
disasters and the construction, repair, and 
operation of flood and storm systems by 
governmental entities and their officers and 
employees are immune from suit for any injury or 
damage resulting from those activities• 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Uectioii 63-30-8 .HMSii 
Waxver of immunity for injury caused i >y ueiectiver 
unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, 
bridges, or other structures. 
IiMiuiin.^  x UK.JIU .^ .^ A. oi ci.li jovernmentaj entities is 
waived for any injury caused by a. defective, 
unsafe^ or dangerous condition of any highway, 
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, 
tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other structure located 
thereon. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 63-3i) ~ 1. (1986) 
Waiver of immunity for injury from da11yt c r ous oJ 
defective public building, structure, or other 
public improvement—Exception. 
;. .;-I'I-..JIJ j «: y irojii suit ol all government a i entitle,- is 
wa ,ved for any injury caused from a dangerou:- or 
defective condition or any pub Lie improvement. 
Immunity is no4- waived f-;-r Jatent defer4- .\rc* 
conditions, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, beuiion o j - j u •• i , \ ±, -J O U J 
Waiver 'if immunity for injury caused by negligent 
act or omission of employee—Exceptions—Waiver 
for injury caused by violation of fourth amendment 
rights. 
<; L ,» Immunity front suit or ai,fc governmental 
entities is waived for injury proximately caused 
by -.5 negligent act or omission of an employee 
committed within the scop<? r** employment except if 
the ini^rv:-
(a) arises out OJL LJJ- ^KBZ cise or 
performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether or 
not the discretion is abused; -^r 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, Section 63-30-10.5 (Supp. 1988) 
Waiver of" iuruauiiiL
 f for taki ng pri vate property 
without compensation. 
( f i Luununit.y from .^ULL ..d: <*.*...* governmental 
entities is waived for the recovery of 
compensation from the governmental entity when the 
governmental entity has taken or damaged private 
property without just compensation. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be 
assessed according to the requirements of Chapter 
34, Title 78. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 78-27-38 (1987) 
Comparative Negligence. 
However, no defendant is liable to any other 
person seeking recovery for an amount in excess of 
the proportion of fault to that defendant. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. SECTION 78-27-40 (1987) 
Amount of liability limited to proportion of 
fault—no contribution 
Subject to Section 78-27-38 the maximum amount for 
which a defendant may be liable to any person 
seeking recovery is that percentage of proportion 
of fault attributed to that defendant. No 
defendant is entitled to contribution from any 
other person. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED. SECTION 1Q-8-8 (1986) 
Streets,, parks, airports
 f parking facilities v 
public grounds and pedestrian malls. 
They may lay out, establish, open, alter, widen, 
narrow, extend, grade, pave or otherwise improve 
streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks, 
parks, airports, parking lots or other facilities 
for the parking of vehicles off streets, public 
grounds, and pedestrian malls and may vacate th€> 
same or parts thereof, by ordinance. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, SECTION 57-5-3 (1986) 
Maps and plats to be acknowledgedf certified, 
approvedf and recorded. 
Such map or plat shall be acknowledged. .. .and 
certified by the surveyor making such plat; if the 
land is situated in any city or incorporated town 
such plat or map shall be approved by its 
governing body.... 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Landforms are the developers of 
Bridlewood Subdivision, located in Bountiful, Utah. The 
- - ^ '. .pj^- ' i- hree phases. 
? * The pr el L H U H O J y p 1 ans of x ne ^LH/U-L V I S P . - --- -
approved December S 19H* lack Balling Deposition, Exhibit 
9 • >•• * -'.a* 
Developer to provide on-site storm detention 
facilities to satisfaction of Bountiful ^it-y, 
Davis County and adjacent property owners. 
final approval * Phase t Bridlewood Subdivision, (Jack 
• > *-| « * . * >- f to d numbejL of 
conditions, -:. n^ * wi* * . - : 
Providing for storm detention fox the runoff .in 
the Hooper Canyon Drainage Basin, with the release 
rate of 2 c.f.s. The release rate and conditions 
were agreed upon when the property was annexed by 
Bountiful 
4 c ; e iiridJ i^provai f as 
ultimately determined by Davis County i.-,s agree ;•/ 
Landforms. that Landforms participate in the construction of 
a regions. .--.*-• s- * i• - * •>•-.. , • • - • v-:. i 
Boulevard site, (Jack Bailing Deposition, P..5^« 
5, r^iri:nj Llie ^omrie-* i^ " * that regional 
detention basin, ...ancJtorms was ie,ju ; *-• « . .,
 r . a 
flood control measures, (Jack Balling Deposition, p 
* :'sd f c ; ;i <-• i i i r/ea L U construct a road 
through the Subdivision .
 : uidei to provide a secono dc-.^s 
which (AT'"^  required -»nd was fnjrsaar.it to City Ordinance. 
tiiack t^a.iix.-j L-e^^j' ; n u • p v ^  nn f':oo— - -.-f 
streets and the purposes ot curbs, gutters, inlet boxes and 
-". . .. .J Sturm detention basins 16 i ^ the 
collection and management of storm waters, (Jack Balling 
Affidavits, R.135, 525). 
7. Plaintiffs allege that on a number of 
occasions since December, 1985 and as recent as August, 
1987, but principally on August 20, 1986, storm water runoff 
coming from Landforms Bridlewood Subdivision damaged their 
property, thus precipitating this lawsuit. 
8. The plaintiffs filed an action against the 
defendants (Landforms) on December 11, 1986. On October 30, 
1987 the plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (R.40) 
and alleged in five causes of action that damages were 
sustained from: 
(1) "....diverting the natural flow of runoff 
from the property" 
(2) "allowing excessive and substantial runoff 
water to flood plaintiffs' properties" 
(3) "the instances of flooding caused by wrongful 
action and admission of the defendants.... interfered 
with plaintiffs use and enjoyment of their property" 
(4) "defendants have been put on notice of the 
numerous floodings...." 
(5) "defendants acted maliciously and wantonly in 
complete disregard for the rights and safety of 
plaintiffs in causes of action 1 through 4" 
9. Landforms filed an Amended Third-Party 
Complaint, (R.418) wherein they alleged: 
(14) "In the event these defendants are found 
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liable to plaintiffs....therefore, in such event, 
these defendants are entitled to be fully indemnified 
and recover judgment over against Bountiful City and 
Davis County. . . ." 
10. They further alleged Bountiful City and Davis 
County negligently delayed the construction of the 
Bridlewood Subdivision by their indecision with respect to 
the regional detention basin....this delay caused a 
potential flood hazard to exist in that Bridlewood remained 
only partially complete without curb, gutter, asphalt roads, 
catch basins and a permanent storm detention facility.... 
they further alleged that Bountiful City and Davis County 
negligently and carelessly required third-party plaintiffs 
to cut one roadway in Bridlewood from top to bottom. 
4. Bountiful filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, (R.133). The Court granted Summary Judgment 
(R.44 6). The court concluded that: 
(4) The immunity granted by the Act extends to 
the acts or the failure to do the acts of 
planning, designing, constructing, repairing and 
operating or managing flood waters. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The judgment of the trial court should be 
affirmed. 
A. The action of Bountiful with respect to the 
Bridlewood Subdivision involved the management of flood 
waters or the construction, repair and operation of flood 
and storm systems and was thus a governmental function with 
absolute immunity. 
In plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, they allege that 
the defendants (Third-Party Plaintiffs and others) through 
their acts and omissions negligently and carelessly planned, 
designed and developed flood control improvements, causing 
plaintiffs damages. In Landforms Amended Third-Party 
Complaint they allege that the flood and storm control work 
was performed in accordance with Bountiful City's 
requirements and they were prevented from developing a storm 
detention basin and that Bountiful delayed construction of 
the subdivision; delayed making a decision on the 
construction of a regional detention basin; required a road 
from top to bottom of the project. All of these acts 
complained of relate to the management of flood waters or 
the construction, repair and operation of flood and storm 
systems. 
B. The second paragraph of Section 63-30-3 of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act (at all times hereafter, 
the "Act") granted absolute immunity for the management of 
flood waters and the construction, repair and operation of 
flood and storm systems by governmental entities. 
C. Even if the actions of the City was not a 
governmental function under Section 63-30-3 of the Act, 
which it was, such actions were governmental functions under 
the test in Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., infra. The 
actions are of "such a unique nature that it can be only 
performed by a governmental agency or that it is essential 
to the core of governmental activity". 
-12-
D. Immunity is not waived for injury from 
dangerous or defective structures or other improvementsr or 
for injury caused by defective condition of highway, bridges 
or other structures, because those acts are not elements of 
the causes of actions and were not complained of in the 
Amended Complaint or the Amended Third-Party Complaint. 
Additionally, Section 63-30-3 of the Act grants absolute 
immunity. 
E. The waiver under Section 63-30-10.5 of the 
Act does not apply as it was enacted after the acts 
complained of and the damages sustained. Additionally, the 
"taking" or "damage" of private property does not relate to 
unintentional damage or negligence sounding in tort. 
F. Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution does not render Section 63-30-3 of the Act 
invalid. The constitutional provision is not self-executing 
and does not include unintentional or negligent damages 
sounding in tort. 
G. Granting absolute immunity is not 
inconsistent with the Utah Comparative Fault Act. The 
Comparative Fault Act does not require the inclusion of all 
parties to the action and the court, even so, can consider 
the comparative fault of all parties to an occurrence or 
incident even though some of them are not party litigants. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
-13-
THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY BOUNTIFUL CITY IN 
RELATION TO THE BRIDLEWOOD PROJECT INVOLVED 
THE MANAGEMENT OF FLOOD WATERS AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION, REPAIR AND OPERATION OF FLOOD 
AND STORM SYSTEMS AND WAS A GOVERNMENTAL 
FUNCTION WITH ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY 
A. Governmental Function 
Landforms suggests that the actions taken by 
Bountiful City in relation to the Bridlewood project did not 
involve the management of flood waters or the construction, 
repair, or operation of flood and storm systems. 
To consider this issue we must go to plaintiffs'" 
First Amended Complaint (R.40) and Landforms Amended Third-
Party Complaint. (R.418)• In plaintiffs' First Amended 
Complaint it is alleged that the defendants (third-party 
plaintiffs and others) through their acts and omissions 
negligently and carelessly planned, designed and developed 
and constructed improvements which changed natural 
conditions and contour of the property, thus increasing, 
aggravating, concentrating and diverting the natural flow of 
runoff and causing flood damage. And from the foregoing the 
defendants were negligent, trespassed, caused a nuisance and 
intentionally inflicted and caused emotional distress. 
Landforms' Amended Third-Party Complaint alleges: 
(Paraphrased) 
(a) Flood and storm control work performed 
by third-party plaintiffs was in accordance with 
Bountiful City and Davis County requirements. 
This work: 
(1) Prevented third-party plaintiffs 
from developing their own storm detention 
basin. 
(2) Delayed construction of the 
subdivision which caused potential flood 
hazards. 
(3) Delayed making a decision on the 
construction of a regional storm detention 
basin. 
(4) Required a road from top to bottom 
of the project which acted as a funnel or 
channel for waters which flowed in 
plaintiff's property and caused damage. 
In the affidavit and supplemental affidavit of 
Jack P. Balling, Bountiful City Engineer, he indicated that: 
4. One of the purposes of streets and the 
purposes of curbs, gutters, inlet boxes and storm 
drain lines and storm detention basins are for the 
collection and management of storm waters. 
(Affidavit). 
3. The flood and storm water systems 
devised by Davis County and Bountiful City 
consists of creeks and waterways; a complex of 
streets, curbs, gutters, inlet boxes and storm 
drain pipes, culverts and water detention basins. 
(Supplemental Affidavit). 
4. The streets, curbs, gutters, inlet 
boxes, storm drain pipes, culverts and water 
detention basins within the Bridlewood Subdivision 
and the plans and construction of the particular 
regional detention basin mentioned in the third-
party plaintiffs' complaint is a part of this 
system and is within the Hooper Canyon drainage 
district system. (Supplemental Affidavit). 
The lower court granted Bountiful's motion for 
summary judgment and concluded as a finding of fact: 
The immunity granted by the Act extends to the 
acts or the failure to do the acts of planning, 
designing, constructing, repairing and operating 
or managing flood waters. 
It is quite evident that the acts complained of in 
plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint and the 
Amended Third-Party Complaint were in the 
management of flood waters or in the construction, 
repair and operation of flood and storm systems 
and involved acts or the failure to act to do the 
acts of planning, designing, constructing, 
repairing and operating or managing flood waters. 
B. Absolute Immunity 
Section 63-30-3 of the Act, as amended, grants 
absolute immunity to governmental entities engaged in the 
management of flood waters and the construction, repair and 
operation of flood and storm systems. 
During its 1984 budget session the Utah 
Legislature passed a "Flood Relief" Bill, Senate Bill 97, 
that contained an amendment to Section 63-30-3 of the Act. 
The Section with the amended portion reads as follows: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this [act] 
Chapter, all governmental entities are immune from 
suit for any injury which results from the 
e x e r c i s e of a governmental function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or 
other governmental health care facility, and from 
any approved medical, nursing or other 
professional health care clinical training 
program conducted in either public or private 
facilities. 
The m^pag$m$nt <?f flppfl water? and the 
construction, repair, and the operation of flood 
and StQrm sy?tem? £y gQvernmentftl entities ar_e 
considered to be governmental functions, and, 
governmental entities and their officers and 
employees are immune from suit for any injury or 
damage resulting from these activities. 
(Emphasis added) 
It should be noted that 63-30-3 of the Act is 
divided into two independent provisions. Prior to 1984 the 
first paragraph existed alone, granting an immunity from 
suit qualified by the phrase "except as may be otherwise 
provided in this Chapter". 
Following the statewide floods of 1983, the 
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Legislature amended Section 3 by adding the second 
paragraph• That new provision gives an absolute and 
unqualified immunity from suit to governmental entities for 
flood and storm-related activities. 
The qualifying language found in the first 
paragraph of Section 63-30-3 of the Act does not apply to 
the construction, repair and operation of flood and storm 
systems. If the Legislature had intended for the qualifying 
phrase to carry over to the new provision, it would have 
completed the amendment at that point where it defined these 
activities as a "governmental function" and would have 
simply added it to the first paragraph rather than creating 
an entirely new paragraph. By enacting a second paragraph 
with the clear language that governmental entities and their 
officers and employees "are immune from suit for any injury 
or damage resulting from" flood related activities, however, 
the Legislature intended and accomplished the statement that 
such activities are given absolute immunity. 
Decisions rendered by the First, Second, Third, 
Fourth Judicial Districts, with factual similarities and 
identical legal issues, as the incident case, have held 
that governmental entities are immune from suit for the 
management of flood waters and the construction, repair and 
operation of flood and storm systems. Although these 
decisions are not binding on this court, they do provide 
persuasive authority and this court should adhere to these 
consistent, well-reasoned decisions. 
POINT II 
THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY BOUNTIFUL CITY IN 
THE MANAGEMENT OF FLOOD WATERS AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION, REPAIR AND OPERATION OF 
FLOOD AND STORM SYSTEMS, WAS A 
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION 
A. A Governmental Function 
Landforms argues that the actions taken by 
Bountiful City are not governmental functions. In Point I 
Bountiful argued that the actions taken by Bountiful 
involved the management of flood waters and the 
construction, repair and operation of flood and storm 
systems. It then follows that such activities are 
governmental functions by virtue of paragraph 2 of Section 
63-30-3 of the Act which provides: 
The management of flood waters and other natural 
disasters and the construction, repair and 
operation of flood and storm systems by 
governmental entities are considered to be 
governmental functions and governmental entities 
and their officers and employees are immune from 
suit for any injury or damage resulting from these 
activities. (Emphasis added) 
We submit that this statute is controlling and dispositive. 
We hesitate to argue any alternative position, but will do 
so. Even if the foregoing Section is not controlling, which 
we firmly submit that it is, under all other tests the 
actions of Bountiful City were "governmental functions". 
The actions were governmental functions under the test in 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah, 
1980) at page 1236: 
The [Test] for determining governmental immunity 
is whether the activity under consideration is of 
such a unique nature that it can only be performed 
by a governmental agency or that it is essential 
to the core of governmental activity. 
In this situation only a government can make 
decisions on a city-wide flood control system or establish a 
city-wide street system or approve a subdivision. Such 
actions are clearly a governmental function under 
Standiford, supra. 
B. Immunity Not Waived. 
No statutory waivers apply to this situation as 
immunity is absolute. Landforms argue a waiver under 
Section 63-30-8 of the Act, a waiver of immunity for injury 
caused by defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of 
highways, bridges or other structures. It is not alleged 
either in plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint or in the 
Amended Third-Party Complaint that there was a defective, 
unsafe or dangerous condition of a highway, bridge or other 
structures. 
Landforms argues a waiver under Section 63-30-9, 
which provides for a waiver of immunity for injury from 
dangerous or defective public buildings, structures or other 
public improvements. In plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint 
and in Landforms Amended Third-Party Complaint they do not 
allege a dangerous, defective structure, dam, reservoir or 
other public improvement and they cannot raise it on appeal. 
Again, it is not shown that a dam, reservoir or 
other public improvement was defectively made. Nothing 
broke or collapsed due to being defectively made. 
Landforms next argue a waiver under Section 63-30-
10 of the Act, which provides for a waiver of immunity for 
injury caused by the negligent act or omission of an 
employee, but provides there is no waiver if the negligence: 
(a) Arises from the exercise or performance of or 
the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function. 
In this case the decisions of whether to have a 
regional detention basin or not and whether to have a road 
put in fully or in phases, are discretionary• Gleave v. 
Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 749 P.2d 660 
(Utah, app, 1988) sets forth an approach to this issue: 
More recently in Little v. Utah State Division of 
Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah, 1983), the 
Court adopted the following test for 
distinguishing between functions at the policy-
making level from those at the operational level, 
requiring affirmative answers to four preliminary 
questions in order for an act to be purely 
discretionary: 
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or 
decision necessarily involve a basic 
governmental policy, program or objective? 
(2) Is the question, act, omission or 
decision essential to the realization or 
accomplishment of that policy, program or 
objective, as opposed to one which would not 
change the course or direction of the 
policy, program or objective? 
(3) Does the act, omission or decision 
require the exercise of basic policy 
evaluation, judgment and expertise on the 
part of the governmental agency involved? 
(4) Does the governmental agency involved 
possess the requisite constitutional 
statutory or lawful authority and duty to do 
or make the challenged act, omission or 
decision? 
In this particular case the actions of Bountiful 
complained of by Landforms were purely discretionary for the 
following reasons: 
(1) The challenged acts (full-length road and 
regional detention basin) involve basic governmental 
policies, programs or objectives . A coherent, workable 
street plan is a policy of the City. Also, a flood control 
system utilizing streets and regional detention basins is a 
governmental program and objective. 
(2) Landforms urge that the local detention basin 
system was better but this would change the course and 
direction of the government's policies, programs and 
objectives. The same is true for streets. 
(3) The decisions concerning streets and a 
regional detention basin system, are an exercise of a basic 
policy evaluation and judgment based on the expertise on the 
part of the government. 
(4) The actions of Bountiful are fully authorized 
by lawful authority. The authority to lay out streets is 
given in Section 10-8-8, UCA, 1953, and to approve 
subdivisions in Section 57-5-3, UCA, 1953. The city's plan 
of a regional detention system is pursuant to a county-wide 
flood control system, authorized by Davis County Ordinance 
No. 01-87. 
Meeting all four requirements the actions 
complained of were purely discretionary and therefore 
immunity is not waived under 63-30-10. 
Plaintiff also contends that the 1987 enactment of 
Section 63-30-10.5 of the Act now authorizes the maintenance 
of the suit for the "taking" or "damage" of private property 
for public use without just compensation. The City concurs 
that such a suit may be brought if the Legislature has 
enacted appropriate enabling legislation. They have not 
done so. 
In the instant case, Section 63-30-10.5 is of no 
avail to third-party plaintiffs for two reasons: (1) The 
statute gives rise to a new cause of action which did not 
exist prior to April, 1987, (the effective date) and, (2) 
The statute does not contemplate suit sounding in tort or 
negligence. In paragraph 26 of plaintiff's First Amended 
Complaint, they alleged that instances of flooding 
"occurred on numerous occasions since December, 1985, and as 
recent as August, 1987....". In third-party defendant 
Bountiful's First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiffs, the 
question was asked of the plaintiffs to indicate the dates 
of all floods which plaintiffs allege caused them damages. 
The answer to that interrogatory no. 1 was the first week in 
December, 1985, on or about March 9, 1986, on or about July 
23, 1986, on or about August 20, 1986, and September, 1986. 
Section 63-30-10.5 is not retroactive. The 
principles relating to retroactive application of laws 
enacted by the Legislature are settled in Okland 
Construction Company v. Industrial Commission, 520 P.2d 108 
(Utah, 1974) . A later statute or amendment should not be 
applied in a retroactive manner to deprive a party of his 
rights or impose a greater liability upon him. That 
principle has no application when the latter statute or 
amendment deals only with the clarification or application 
as to how the laws should have been understood prior to its 
enactment. This court stated in Carlucci v. Utah State 
Industrial Commission, 725 P.2d 1335 (Utah, 1986) 
The law establishing substantive rights and 
liabilities when a cause of action arises, and not 
a subsequently enacted statute, governs the 
resolution of a dispute. .. .However... statutes 
which are procedural only and do not create, alter 
or destroy substantive rights may be applied to 
courses of action that have accrued or are pending 
at the time the statute is enacted. (Emphasis 
added) 
The 1987 enactment of Section 63-30-10.5 created a 
substantive right which theretofore had not existed where 
the flooding damage occurred in 1985 and 1986. 
Secondly, in a proper case for application of 
Section 63-30-10.5, it is clear that the action is meant to 
cover only those "takings11 or "damagings" occurring 
pursuant to sovereign power of eminent domain. The Section 
does not apply where property damage results from the 
negligence of governmental entities. Where there is no 
deliberate "taking" or necessary damage of private property 
for public use, but only negligence of governmental officers 
or employees engaged in the execution of a governmental 
function, then no constitutional claim against the 
governmental entity exists, rather, the claim sounds in tort 
and requires a common law action for damages. 
In his concurring opinion in Sprinaville Banking 
Company v. Burton, 349 P.2d 157, (Utah, 1960), Justice Wade 
said at page 166: 
Such compensation must result from or grow out of 
a public use of property, either the property 
taken or other property used for a public 
purpose. . . .Such public use must be (1) the State 
is entitled to make, and it must be intentionally 
made by the duly constituted public officers and 
not be merely the result of negligence or other 
wrongful acts which create ordinary tort 
liability. (Emphasis added) 
In his dissent in Fairclough v Salt Lake County, 
354 P.2d 105 (Utah, 1960), Justice Wade said at 110-111: 
This provision (Article I, Section 22, Utah 
Constitution) clearly requires the taking or 
damaging of tangible private property and that the 
public use must be intentional and not merely 
accidental or negligently caused. So damages for 
personal injuries or from breach of contract and 
all damages except from an intentional public use 
are not included in such consent. 
...It is generally recognized that accidental or 
negligent injury is not a damage to private 
property for public use, so that case has no 
bearing on our problem. 
POINT III 
SECTION 63-30-3 IS CONSTITUTIONAL 
EVEN IN VIEW OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 
22 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
A. Article I, Section 22 of the Constitution of 
Utah. 
The Utah Case Law on this issue is stated in the 
opinions of Utah Supreme Court Justices Henroid and Wade. 
Their concurring opinions, dissents and rebuttals are in 
Sprinaville Banking Company v. Burton, supra; Fairclough v. 
Salt Lake County, supra; and, State Road Commission v. 
Parker, 368 P.2d 585 (Utah, 1962); firmly establish the 
application and meaning of Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution. Justice Henroid's view was upheld by the Utah 
Supreme Court. When Justice Wade was in dissent, he was 
alone. The Court's position is without qualification, 
equivocation or condition, that sovereign immunity protects 
governmental entities in the State of Utah from suits 
brought for the purpose of obtaining compensation, for the 
taking or damaging of private property for public use; and 
that Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution is not 
self-executing so as to constitute a waiver of that 
immunity. Further, the cases have clearly set forth the 
rule that consent for the State (governmental entities) to 
be sued is a legislative matter and will not be created nor 
inferred by the courts. These holdings are based upon the 
precedence of Wilkinson v. State, 134 P. 626 (Utah, 1913); 
Campbell Building Company v. State Road Commission, 70 P.2d 
857 (Utah, 1937); ££a£s vs_. State Rpafl CQmmiggiQn v^ 
District Court, Fourth Judicial District, 78 P.2d 502 (Utah, 
1937); Binaham v. Board of Education, 223 P.2d 432 (Utah, 
1950); Hiorth v. Whittenbera, 241 P.2d 907 (Utah, 1952). 
These holdings continued without any change whatsoever up to 
the passage of the Legislature of the Governmental Immunity 
Act (63-30-1 et.seq.) Utah Code, 1953; see Hurst v. Highway 
Department, 397 P.2d 71 (Utah, 1964); and Sine v. Helland, 
418 P.2d 979 Utah, 1966); therefore, the Governmental 
Immunity Act (the "Act") "substituted a statutory framework" 
for the common law of sovereign immunity existing prior 
thereto in the State, "to be interpreted by the Courts and 
re-shaped by the Legislature as necessary from time to 
time". Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah, 1983), 629-
630. 
Upon its enactment in 1965 this statutory 
framework for governmental immunity did not provide consent 
for the sovereign to be sued for "taking" or "damaging" 
private property for public use. The Act retained sovereign 
immunity, except as waived therein. As a result the Utah 
Supreme Court found no basis in the Act to permit a suit, 
pursuant to Article I, Section 22. 
In Holt v. Utah State Road Commission, 522 P.2d 
1286 (Utah, 1973), the Court stated: 
The law has long been established in this State 
that under (the claim of taking a property without 
compensation) there can be no recovery from the 
State for damages.... Sufficient has been said as 
to the pro and con of this subject that we think 
it unnecessary and undesirable to extenuate 
thereon, but refer to the adjudicated cases. 
The Court's reference is to the following cases: 
StfrtQ v^ Fpyirth Digtrigt CQUrtr Supra; Hjprth v.*. 
Whittenbera, supra; Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, supra; 
Springville Banking Company v. Burton, supra; State v. 
Parker, supra; and Anderson Investment Corp., v. State of 
Utah, 503 P.2d 144 (Utah, 1972). 
Thus, there is absolutely no basis for third-party 
plaintiffs in this case to seek or obtain recovery from 
Bountiful pursuant to Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
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POINT IV 
GRANTING BOUNTIFUL ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY IS NOT 
INCONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSE OF THE UTAH 
COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT 
Landforms urges that the Utah Comparative Fault 
Act requires the fault of all parties to an occurrence be 
compared at trial in order for the fault of the respective 
parties to be accurately apportioned. They cite the 
following: 
78-27-38 Comparative Negligence 
However, no defendant is liable to any other 
person seeking recovery for an amount in excess of 
the proportion of fault to that defendant, 
(Emphasis added) 
78-27-40 Amount of Liability Limited to Proportion 
of Fault—No Contribution 
Subject to Section 78-27-38 the maximum amount for 
which a defendant may be liable to any person 
seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion 
of fault attributed to that defendant. No 
defendant is entitled to contribution from any 
other person. 
(Emphasis added) 
The Sections above cited do not require the 
inclusion of all parties to make a determination of 
comparative fault. None of the cases cited by Landforms 
stand for the proposition that applying the provisions of 
the Utah Comparative Fault Act in effect constitutes a 
waiver of governmental immunity. 
Landforms cites a number of cases: In Wilson v. 
Probst, 581 P.2d 380 (Kan.,1978) the State as a Third-Party 
plaintiffr was dismissed out of the suit by the lower court. 
The court held that the State had to remain as a named 
party, even though liability could not be established 
against the State given its immunity• In Brown v. Keill, 
580 P. 2d 867 (Kan., 1978), the court held that the liability 
for damages based on the proportionate fault of all the 
parties to the occurrence, could be considered, even though 
one or more parties cannot be joined formally as a litigant. 
In Pocatello Ind. Park Company v. Steel West Inc. 621 P.2d 
399 (Id., 1980), the court held that a jury must have the 
opportunity to consider the negligence of all parties, 
whether or not they be parties to the lawsuit. In Bartlett 
v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc. 646 P.2d 579 (N.Mex., 
1982), the court quoted with approval, Heft and Heft 
Comparative Negligence Manual (1978, Section 8.131): 
It is accepted practice to include all tort 
feasors in the apportionment question. This 
includes non-parties who may be unknown tort 
fgfrgQrg, phantom flrivgrg frnfl p^rgong alleged to 13& 
negligent but not liable in damages to the injured 
party, such as in the Third-Party cases arising in 
Workmen's Compensation area. 
Bountiful contends that the Utah Comparative Fault 
Act does not require the inclusion of all parties in order 
to determine comparative fault. Even so, case law suggests 
that if all parties to the occurrence must be considered in 
determining the comparative fault process, they need not be 
parties to the suit. 
CONCLUSION 
Bountiful submits that the District Court did not 
err in granting Bountiful a Summary Judgment upon the basis 
that their actions involved the management of flood waters 
and other natural disasters, or the construction, repair and 
operation of flood storm systems and thus that they were 
absolutely immune from suit. 
Section 63-30-3 of the Act is not 
unconstitutional in light of Article I, Section 22, of the 
Utah Constitution, which is not self-executing and does not 
apply to unintentional or negligent takings sounded in tort. 
Immunity is not waived by any of the Sections 
granting waivers of immunity and applying and enforcing the 
Utah Comparative Fault Act does not require that Bountiful 
be included in a party litigant and does not waive immunity. 
It is respectfully requested that the judgment of 
the trial court be affirmed. 
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